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Abstract
Logic-based approaches for analyzing and evaluating arguments have been largely studied in recent years,
yielding a variety of formal methods for argumentation-based reasoning. The goal of this paper is to provide
an abstract, proof theoretical investigation of logical argumentation, where arguments are represented by
sequents, conﬂicts between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are
made by dynamic proof systems extending standard sequent calculi.
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1 Introduction
Logical argumentation (sometimes called deductive argumentation) is a logic-based
approach for formalizing debates, disagreements, and entailment relations for draw-
ing conclusions from argumentation-based settings [8,17,18,20]. The basic entities
in this context are called arguments. An argument is a pair of a ﬁnite set of formulas
(Γ, the support set) and a formula (ψ, the conclusion), expressed in an arbitrary
propositional language, such that the latter follows, according to some underlying
logic, from the former. As indicated in [1] and [4], this gives rise to the association of
arguments with Gentzen’s notion of sequents [13], where an argument is expressed
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by a sequent of the form Γ⇒ψ. Accordingly, logical argumentation boils down to
the exposition of formalized methods for reasoning with these syntactical objects.
A ﬁrst step towards a proof theoretical investigation of sequent-based logical
argumentation is done in [3]. In this paper we revise and extend that work. In
particular, we introduce a modiﬁed proof theoretical approach and show that this
approach is better suited to argumentation-based reasoning than that of [3] (see
also Note 5 below). For this, in the next section we recall some basic notions be-
hind abstract argumentation in general and (sequent-based) logical argumentation
in particular. Then, in Section 3 we consider a generic method of drawing conclu-
sions from a given set of sequent-based arguments, which is tolerant to diﬀerent
logics, languages, and attack relations among the arguments. This is achieved by
introducing the notions of dynamic proofs, which are intended for explicating ac-
tual reasoning in an argumentation framework. Unlike ‘standard’ proof methods,
the idea here is that an argument can be challenged by a counter-argument, and so
a certain sequent may be considered as not derived at a certain stage of the proof,
even if it were considered derived in an earlier stage of the proof. In Section 4 we give
some demonstrations showing that despite this non-monotonic nature of dynamic
derivations one may still draw solid conclusions, which are faithful to the intended
semantics of the logical argumentation framework at hand. This is formally proved
in Section 5, where several properties of the underlying entailment relations are
discussed, including some restricted forms of reﬂexivity and monotonicity. Finally,
in Section 6 we give a brief outlook to future work.
2 Preliminaries
We start by reviewing the notion of sequent-based argumentation, as deﬁned in [4].
First, we recall the more general notion of abstract argumentation frameworks.
2.1 Argumentation Frameworks and Their Semantics
Abstract argumentation frameworks are directed graphs, where the nodes repre-
sent (abstract) arguments and the arrows represent attacks between arguments, as
deﬁned next.
Deﬁnition 2.1 An (abstract) argumentation framework [11] is a pair AF =
〈Args ,Attack〉, where Args is a denumerable set of elements, called arguments,
and Attack is a binary relation on Args, whose instances are called attacks .
Given an argumentation framework, a key issue in its understanding is to de-
termine what combinations of arguments (called extensions) can collectively be
accepted from it. For this we recall the notions of conﬂict-freeness and defense.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let AF = 〈Args,Attack〉 be an argumentation framework, A ∈
Args an argument, and E ⊆ Args a set of arguments. We say that E attacks an
argument A if there is an argument B ∈ E that attacks A (i.e., (B,A) ∈ Attack).
The set of arguments that are attacked by E is denoted E+. We say that E defends
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A if E attacks every argument that attacks A. We denote by Def(E) the set of all
the elements that are defended by E . The set E is called conﬂict-free if it does not
attack any of its elements (i.e., E+∩E = ∅), E is called admissible if it is conﬂict-free
and defends all of its elements (i.e., E ⊆ Def(E)), and E is complete if it is admissible
and contains all the arguments that it defends (E = Def(E)).
The requirements deﬁned above express basic properties that every plausible
extension of a framework should have. Intuitively, a set of arguments is conﬂict-free
if all of its elements ‘can stand together’ (since they do not attack each other), and
admissibility guarantees that such elements ‘can stand on their own’, i.e., are able
to respond to any attack by attacks of their own members (see also [5,6]).
Next, we recall some acceptability semantics for an argumentation framework.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [11] Let AF = 〈Args,Attack〉 be an argumentation framework.
• The minimal complete subset of Args is the grounded extension of AF ,
• A maximal complete subset of Args is a preferred extension of AF ,
• A complete subset E of Args that attacks every argument in Args \E is a stable
extension of AF .
We denote by Cmpl(AF) (respectively, Grnd(AF), Prf(AF), Stbl(AF)) the set of
all the complete (respectively, all the grounded, preferred, stable) extensions of AF .
As shown in [11], an argumentation framework always has a unique grounded
extension, but not necessarily a stable extension. If a stable extension does exist,
it is also preferred. Other extensions are considered, e.g., in [5,6].
Example 2.4 Consider the following argumentation framework:
A B C 
D 
E 
Here ∅, {A}, {B} and {B,D} are admissible sets, and with the exception of {B} all
of them are also complete. The grounded extension is ∅, the preferred extensions
are {A} and {B,D}, and the stable extension is {B,D}.
2.2 Sequent-Based Argumentation Frameworks
When it comes to speciﬁc applications of formal argumentation it is often useful to
provide a speciﬁc account of the structure of arguments and the concrete nature of
argumentative attacks. As indicated previously, we do so by following the sequent-
based approach introduced in [1,4]. By this, we are able to fully abstract the notion
of an argument and base it solely on the logical dependency between the support
and the conclusion at hand. Furthermore, treating arguments as sequents allows to
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incorporate well-established proof theoretical means for automatically constructing,
identifying, and reasoning with arguments (see [1,4] for further justiﬁcations).
In what follows, we shall denote by L an arbitrary propositional language.
Atomic formulas in L are denoted by p, q, r, arbitrary sets of formulas in L are
denoted by S, T , and ﬁnite sets of formulas are denoted by Γ, Δ.
Deﬁnition 2.5 A (propositional) logic for a language L is a pair L = 〈L,	〉, where
	 is a (Tarskian) consequence relation for L, that is, a binary relation between sets
of formulas and formulas in L, satisfying the following conditions:
Reﬂexivity : if ψ ∈ S then S 	 ψ.
Monotonicity : if S 	 ψ and S ⊆ S ′, then S ′ 	 ψ.
Transitivity : if S 	 ψ and S ′, ψ 	 φ then S,S ′ 	 φ.
In addition, we shall assume that L is ﬁnitary , that is: if S 	 ψ then there is a ﬁnite
theory Γ ⊆ S such that Γ 	 ψ. 3
We shall assume that the language L contains at least the following connectives:
• a 	-negation ¬, satisfying: p 
	 ¬p and ¬p 
	 p (for every atomic p), 4 and
• a 	-conjunction ∧, satisfying: S 	 ψ ∧ φ iﬀ S 	 ψ and S 	 φ.
For a ﬁnite set Γ we denote by
∧
Γ the conjunction of all the formulas in Γ.
2.2.1 Arguments As Sequents
There are several ways of deﬁning the structure of an argument. The next deﬁnition
is derived from the understanding that sequents are useful for representing logical
arguments since they can be regarded as speciﬁc kinds of judgments (see [1,4] again).
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let L = 〈L,	〉 be a propositional logic and S a set of L-formulas.
• An L-sequent (a sequent, for short) is an expression of the form Γ ⇒ Δ, where
Γ and Δ are ﬁnite sets of L-formulas, and ⇒ is a reserved symbol (not in L).
• An L-argument is an L-sequent of the form Γ ⇒ ψ where Γ 	 ψ.
• An L-argument based on S is an L-argument Γ ⇒ ψ, where Γ ⊆ S. The set of
all the L-arguments that are based on S is denoted ArgL(S).
Note 1 Clearly, Γ ⇒ ψ ∈ ArgL(S) for some (ﬁnite) Γ ⊆ S iﬀ S 	 ψ.
Proof systems that operate on sequents (and so on arguments) are called sequent
calculi [13]. The sequent calculi considered here consist of inference rules of the
form
Γ1 ⇒ Δ1 . . . Γn ⇒ Δn
Γ ⇒ Δ .(1)
3 The last property is satisﬁed by every logic that has a decent proof system, and will be useful in what
follows (see, e.g., Note 1).
4 There is no general agreement about the properties that a negation connective should satisfy (see, e.g.,
the papers collection in [12]). The requirement from a negation connective in this paper is a very minimal
one, taken from [2,16].
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In what follows we shall say that the sequents Γi ⇒ Δi (i = 1, . . . , n) are the
conditions (or the prerequisites) of the rule above, and that Γ ⇒ Δ is its conclusion.
As usual, axioms are treated as inference rules without conditions, i.e., they are rules
of the form Γ⇒Δ .
In the sequel we shall usually assume that the underlying logic has a sound and
complete sequent calculus, that is, a sequent-based proof system C, such that Γ 	 ψ
iﬀ the sequent Γ ⇒ ψ is provable in C.
Example 2.7 In this paper we shall usually use classical logic (CL) for our demon-
strations. Gentzen’s well-known sequent calculus LK, which is sound and complete
for CL, is represented in Figure 1.
Axioms: ψ ⇒ ψ
Structural Rules:
Weakening:
Γ ⇒ Δ
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ Δ,Δ′
Cut:
Γ1 ⇒ Δ1, ψ Γ2, ψ ⇒ Δ2
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ Δ1,Δ2
Logical Rules:
[∧⇒] Γ, ψ, ϕ ⇒ Δ
Γ, ψ ∧ ϕ ⇒ Δ [⇒∧]
Γ ⇒ Δ, ψ Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ
Γ ⇒ Δ, ψ ∧ ϕ
[∨⇒] Γ, ψ ⇒ Δ Γ, ϕ ⇒ Δ
Γ, ψ ∨ ϕ ⇒ Δ [⇒∨]
Γ ⇒ Δ, ψ, ϕ
Γ ⇒ Δ, ψ ∨ ϕ
[⊃⇒] Γ ⇒ ψ,Δ Γ, ϕ ⇒ Δ
Γ, ψ ⊃ ϕ ⇒ Δ [⇒⊃]
Γ, ψ ⇒ ϕ,Δ
Γ ⇒ ψ ⊃ ϕ,Δ
[¬⇒] Γ ⇒ Δ, ψ
Γ,¬ψ ⇒ Δ [⇒¬]
Γ, ψ ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ Δ,¬ψ
Fig. 1. The proof system LK
2.2.2 Attacks as Elimination Rules
Diﬀerent attack relations have been considered in the literature for logical argumen-
tation frameworks (see, e.g., [8,14,17]). In our case, attacks allow for the elimination
(or, the discharging) of sequents. We shall denote by Γ 
⇒ ψ the elimination of the
sequent Γ⇒ψ. Alternatively, s denotes the elimination of s. Now, a sequent elimi-
nation rule (or attack rule) has a similar form as an inference rule, except that its
conclusion is a discharging of one condition, i.e., it is a rule of the following form:
Γ1 ⇒ Δ1, . . . ,Γn ⇒ Δn
Γn 
⇒ Δn .(2)
The prerequisites of attack rules usually consist of three ingredients. To help the
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reader distinguish between these ingredients, we shall write them in a certain or-
der: the ﬁrst sequent in the rule’s prerequisites is the “attacking” sequent, the last
sequent in the rule’s prerequisites is the “attacked” sequent, and the other pre-
requisites are the conditions for the attack. In this view, conclusions of sequent
elimination rules are the eliminations of the attacked arguments.
Example 2.8 Figure 2 lists some elimination rules in the context of logical ar-
gumentation systems (see also [4]). Similar rules for deontic logics and normative
reasoning can be found in [22]. In this paper we shall exploit only a small number
of these rules. We refer to [4,8,14,22] for further demonstrations of their usefulness.
Defeat: [Def]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬
∧
Γ2 Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Strong Defeat: [S-Def]
Γ1 ⇒ ¬
∧
Γ2 Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Direct Defeat: [D-Def]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬φ Γ2, φ ⇒ ψ2
Γ2, φ ⇒ ψ2
Indirect Defeat: [I-Def]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬
∧
Γ2 Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Strong Direct Defeat: [SD-Def]
Γ1 ⇒ ¬φ Γ2, φ ⇒ ψ2
Γ2, φ ⇒ ψ2
Strong Indirect Defeat: [SI-Def]
Γ1 ⇒ ¬
∧
Γ2 Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Undercut: [Ucut]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬
∧
Γ2 ¬
∧
Γ2 ⇒ ψ1 Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Strong Undercut: [S-Ucut]
Γ1 ⇒ ¬
∧
Γ2 Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2,Γ′2 ⇒ ψ2
Direct Undercut: [D-Ucut]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬γ2 ¬γ2 ⇒ ψ1 Γ2, γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2, γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Strong Direct Undercut: [SD-Ucut]
Γ1 ⇒ ¬γ2 Γ2, γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2, γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Canonical Undercut: [C-Ucut]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬
∧
Γ2 ¬
∧
Γ2 ⇒ ψ1 Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Rebuttal: [Reb]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬ψ2 ¬ψ2 ⇒ ψ1 Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Strong Rebuttal: [S-Reb]
Γ1 ⇒ ¬ψ2 Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Defeating Rebuttal: [D-Reb]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ¬ψ2 Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Reductio Defeating Rebuttal: [RD-Reb]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ2 ⇒ ¬ψ1 Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Indirect Rebuttal: [I-Reb]
Γ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ ϕ ψ2 ⇒ ¬ϕ Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Γ2 ⇒ ψ2
Fig. 2. Sequent elimination rules
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2.2.3 Argumentation Settings and the Induced Logical Frameworks
We now combine sequents and elimination rules for deﬁning corresponding argu-
mentation frameworks. For this, we need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.9 An argumentation setting (a setting, for short) is a triple S =
〈L,C,A〉, where L=〈L,	〉 is a propositional logic, C is a sound and complete sequent
calculus for L, and A is a set of attack rules expressed in terms of L-sequents.
Deﬁnition 2.10 Let S = 〈L,C,A〉 be a setting, S a set of formulas, and θ an
L-substitution (that is, a substitution of atoms in L by formulas in L).
• An inference rule R of the form of (1) above is ArgL(S)-applicable (for S, with
respect to θ), if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, θ(Γi) ⇒ θ(Δi) is C-provable.
• An elimination rule R of the form of (2) above is ArgL(S)-applicable (for S,
with respect to θ), if θ(Γ1) ⇒ θ(Δ1) and θ(Γn) ⇒ θ(Δn) are in ArgL(S) and
for each 1 < i < n, θ(Γi) ⇒ θ(Δi) is C-provable.
In the second case above we shall say that θ(Γ1) ⇒ θ(Δ1)R-attacks θ(Γn) ⇒ θ(Δn).
Note that the attacker and the attacked sequents must be elements of ArgL(S).
The induced argumentation framework is now deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.11 Let S = 〈L,C,A〉 be a setting and let S be a set of formulas.
The sequent-based (logical) argumentation framework for S (induced by S) is the
argumentation framework AFS(S) = 〈ArgL(S),Attack〉, where (s1, s2) ∈ Attack iﬀ
there is an R ∈ A such that s1 R-attacks s2.
In what follows, somewhat abusing the notations, we shall sometimes identify
Attack with A.
3 Dynamic Proofs
We now consider the notions of proofs (or derivations) for argumentation settings.
In what follows we ﬁx a given setting S= 〈L,C,A〉 (so that the underlying logic, a
Gentzen-type proof system for it and the elimination rules are pre-determined).
Deﬁnition 3.1 A (proof) tuple (also called derivation steps or proof steps) is a
quadruple 〈i, s, J,A〉, where i (the tuple’s index) is a natural number, s (the tuple’s
sequent) is either a sequent or an eliminated sequent, J (the tuple’s justiﬁcation) is
a string, and A (the tuple’s attacker) is an empty-set or a singleton of a sequent.
In what follows we shall sometimes omit the last component of a tuple in case
that it is the empty-set, and omit the enclosing parentheses if it is a singleton.
As in ‘standard’ Gentzen-type systems, proofs are sequences of tuples, obtained
by applications of rules. In our case, the underlying rules may be either introductory
or eliminating, that is, applications of elements in C or A, as deﬁned next.
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Deﬁnition 3.2 LetS=〈L,C,A〉 be a setting and S a set of formulas in L. A simple
(dynamic) derivation (with respect to S and S) is a ﬁnite sequence D = 〈T1, . . . Tm〉
of proof tuples, where each Ti ∈ D is of one of the following forms:
• Introducing Tuples, of the form Ti = 〈i, θ(Γ) ⇒ θ(Δ), J, ∅〉, where there is an
inference ruleR ∈ C of the form of (1) above that is ArgL(S)-applicable for some
L-substitution θ, and for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n there is a proof tuple 〈ik, sk, Jk, ∅〉
in which ik < i and sk = θ(Γk) ⇒ θ(Δk). In this case, J =“R; i1, . . . , in”.
• Eliminating Tuples, of the form Ti = 〈i, θ(Γn) 
⇒ θ(Δn), J, θ(Γ1) ⇒ θ(Δ1)〉,
where there is an elimination rule R ∈ A of the form of (2) above that is
ArgL(S)-applicable for some L-substitution θ, 5 and for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n there
is a proof tuple 〈ik, sk, Jk, ∅〉, in which ik < i and sk = θ(Γk) ⇒ θ(Δk). In this
case, J =“R; i1, . . . , in”.
In the sequel we shall sometimes identify introducing tuples with their derived
sequents and eliminating tuples with their attacking sequents.
Given a simple derivation D, we shall denote by Top(D) the tuple with the
highest index in D and by Tail(D) the simple derivation D without Top(D). Also,
we shall denote by D′ = D ⊕ 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉 the simple derivation whose preﬁx is
D and whose suﬃx is 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉 (Thus, for instance, when n = 1 we have that
T = Top(D⊕T ) and D = Tail(D⊕T )). We call D′ the extension of D by 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉.
To indicate that the validity of a derived sequent (in a simple derivation) is in
question due to attacks on it, we need the following evaluation process.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Given a simple derivation D, the iterative top-down function
Evaluate(D) (see Algorithm 1) computes the following three sets: Elim(D) – the
sequents that (at least once in D) are attacked by an attacker which is not al-
ready attacked, Attack(D) – the sequents that attack a sequent in Elim(D), and
Accept(D) – the derived sequents in D that are not in Elim(D).
Deﬁnition 3.4 A simple derivation D is coherent , if Attack(D) ∩ Elim(D) = ∅. 6
Next, we show the adequacy of Algorithm 1 for a derivation D, in terms of the
argumentation framework induced by that derivation.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let D be a simple derivation. The sequent-based argumentation
framework that is induced by D is the graph AF(D) = 〈Derived(D),Attack(D)〉,
where s ∈ Derived(D) if there is an introducing tuple 〈i, s, J, ∅〉 in D, and (r, s) ∈
Attack(D) if there is an eliminating tuple 〈i, s, J, r〉 in D. 7
5 Remember that this means, in particular, that the attacking sequent θ(Γ1) ⇒ θ(Δ1) and the attacked
sequent θ(Γn) ⇒ θ(Δn) are both in ArgL(S). This prevents situations in which, e.g., ¬p ⇒ ¬p attacks
p ⇒ p, although S = {p}.
6 That is, there is no sequent that eliminates another sequent, and later on is eliminated itself.
7 Note that while Derived(D) is the same as the set Derived(D) produced by the function Evaluate(D)
(Algorithm 1), Attack(D) is not the same as the set Attack(D) produced by that function, since here just
the existence of an eliminating tuple merits a directed edge from the attacker to the attacked sequent, no
matter whether the attacker is counter-attacked.
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function Evaluate(D) /* D – a simple derivation */
Attack := ∅; Elim := ∅; Derived := ∅;
while (D is not empty) do {
if (Top(D) = 〈i, s, J, ∅〉) then /* Top(D) is an introducing tuple */
Derived := Derived ∪ {s};
if (Top(D) = 〈i, s, J, r〉) then /* Top(D) is an attacking tuple */
if (r 
∈ Elim) then Elim := Elim ∪ {s} and Attack := Attack ∪ {r};
D := Tail(D); }
Accept := Derived − Elim;
return (Attack, Elim, Accept)
Algorithm 1. Evaluation of a simple derivation
Proposition 3.6 For every simple derivation D the set Accept(D) is conﬂict-free
in AF(D). If D is coherent then Accept(D) is a stable extension of AF(D).
Sketch of proof. We show that Accept(D) has the property deﬁning stable sets,
namely that Accept(D) ∪ Accept(D)+ = Derived(D), leaving the other properties
(conﬂict-freeness, admissibility and completeness) to the reader.
Since Derived(D) = Accept(D) ∪ Elim(D), it is enough to show that Accept(D)+
coincides with Elim(D). Indeed,
• To see that Elim(D) ⊆ Accept(D)+, let s ∈ Elim(D). Hence, there is an attacking
tuple T = 〈i, s, J, t〉 ∈ D and when the algorithm reaches T , we have that t 
∈
Elim(D). Thus t ∈ Attack(D), and since D is coherent, t 
∈ Elim(D) also when the
algorithm terminates. It follows that t ∈ Accept(D), and so s ∈ Accept(D)+.
• To see that Accept(D)+ ⊆ Elim(D), let s ∈ Accept(D)+. Then there is a tuple
T = 〈i, s, J, t〉 ∈ D such that t ∈ Accept(D). Since D is coherent, at the end of the
execution of the algorithm t 
∈ Elim(D). Thus, since Elim(D) grows monotonically
during the execution, in particular t 
∈ Elim(D) when the algorithm reaches the
tuple T . It follows that s ∈ Elim(D). 
Interestingly, the following proposition also holds:
Proposition 3.7 Let D be a simple derivation. If E is a stable extension of AF(D)
then there is a coherent simple derivation D′ such that AF(D′) = AF(D) and
E = Accept(D′).
Proof. Let D be a simple derivation and let E be a stable extension of the sequent-
based argumentation framework AF(D) = 〈Derived(D),Attack(D)〉 that is induced
by D. Consider a simple derivation D′ = D′1⊕D′2⊕D′3, where D′1 contains the tuples
introducing the sequents in Derived(D), D′3 consists of tuples of the form 〈i, s, J, t〉
where t ∈ E and s ∈ E+, and D′2 consists of the attacking tuples for the other
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elements in Attack(D) (the order of the elements in D′2 and in D′3 may be arbitrary,
and some of these sequences may be empty for some D′). Now, by the deﬁnition
of D′, clearly AF(D′) = AF(D). Also, since E is stable, E+ = Derived(D) \ E =
Derived(D′) \ E , and so when the algorithm completes its pass over D′3 it holds
that Attack(D′) = E and Elim(D′) = Derived(D′) \ E . Clearly, the other tuples
will not aﬀect these sets, thus D′ is coherent (since Accept(D′) ∩ Elim(D′) = ∅) and
Accept(D′) = Derived(D′) \ Elim(D′) = E . 
Together, Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 show a correspondence between accepted sets
of coherent simple derivations and the stable models of sequent-based argumentation
framework that are induced by those derivations.
Now we are ready to deﬁne derivations in a dynamic proof system.
Deﬁnition 3.8 Let S=〈L,C,A〉 be an argumentation setting and let S be a set of
formulas in L. A (dynamic) derivation (for S, based on S) is a simple derivation
D of one of the following forms:
a) D = 〈T 〉, where T = 〈1, s, J, ∅〉 is a proof tuple.
b) D is an extension of a dynamic derivation by a sequence 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉 of intro-
ducing tuples (of the form 〈i, s, J, ∅〉), whose derived sequents (the s’s) are not
in Elim(D).
c) D is an extension of a dynamic derivation by a sequence 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉 of elimi-
nating tuples (of the form 〈i, s, J, r〉), such that:
(i) D is coherent: Attack(D) ∩ Elim(D) = ∅, and
(ii) the new attacking sequents (the r’s) are not A-attacked by sequents in
Accept(D) ∩ ArgL(S), where the attack is based on prerequisite conditions
in D.
Note 2 Conditions c(i) and c(ii) above assure that the attacks are sound: by co-
herence neither of the attacking sequents of the additional elimination tuples is in
Elim(D), and by Condition c(ii) they are not attacked by an accepted S-based se-
quent. As we show below (see Footnote 11), these two conditions are not dependent.
Intuitively, one may think of a dynamic derivation as a proof that progresses
over derivation steps. At each step the current derivation is extended by a ‘block’
of introducing or eliminating tuples (satisfying certain validity conditions), and
the status of the derived sequents is updated accordingly. In particular, derived
sequents may be eliminated (i.e., marked as unreliable) in light of new proof tuples,
but also the other way around is possible: an eliminated sequent may be ‘restored’
if its attacking tuple is counter-attacked by a new eliminating tuple. It follows
that previously derived data may not be derived anymore (and vice-versa) until
and unless new derived information revises the state of aﬀairs (see the examples in
Section 4).
Proposition 3.9 Every dynamic derivation is coherent.
Proof. Easily follows from Deﬁnition 3.8. 
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The next deﬁnition, of the outcomes of a dynamic derivation, states that we can
safely (or ’ﬁnally’) derive a derived sequent only when we are sure that there is no
scenario in which it will be eliminated in some extension of the derivation.
Deﬁnition 3.10 Let S=〈L,C,A〉 be a setting and let S be a set of formulas in L.
A sequent s is ﬁnally derived (or safely derived) in a dynamic derivation D (for S,
based on S), if s ∈ Accept(D), and D cannot be extended to a dynamic derivation
D′ (for S, based on S) such that s ∈ Elim(D′).
Note 3 Unlike ordinary proofs (e.g., in standard sequent calculi), the amount of
derived sequents does not grow monotonically in the size of the derivation. However,
ﬁnal derivability is monotonic in the length of dynamic derivations. Indeed,
Proposition 3.11 If s is ﬁnally derived in D then it is ﬁnally derived in any ex-
tension of D.
The induced entailment is now deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.12 Given an argumentation setting S = 〈L,C,A〉 and a set S of
formulas, we denote by S |∼S ψ that there is an S-based dynamic derivation for S,
in which Γ ⇒ ψ is ﬁnally derived for some ﬁnite Γ ⊆ S.
When the underlying argumentation setting is clear from the context we shall
sometimes abbreviate |∼S by |∼.
4 Some Examples
We now give some examples of dynamic derivations. To simplify the reading, in the
examples below we shall sometimes use abbreviations or omit some details, e.g. the
tuple signs in proof steps.
Example 4.1 Consider the argumentation setting S = 〈CL, LK,Ucut〉, based on
classical logic CL, its sequent calculus LK (Figure 1), and the attack rule Undercut
(Figure 2). Below is a dynamic derivation for S, based on S1 = {p,¬p, q}:
1. p ⇒ p Axiom
2. ⇒ p,¬p [⇒¬], 1
3. ⇒ p ∨ ¬p [⇒∨], 2
4. p ∨ ¬p ⇒ ¬(p ∧ ¬p) . . .
5. ¬(p ∧ ¬p) ⇒ p ∨ ¬p . . .
6. q ⇒ q Axiom
Note that q ⇒ q is ﬁnally derived here. Indeed, the only sequents in ArgCL(S1)
that can potentially attack q ⇒ q are of the form p,¬p ⇒ ψ or p,¬p, q ⇒ ψ, where
ψ is logically equivalent to ¬q, however those sequents are counter attacked by
⇒ p∨¬p (which is derived in Tuple 3), using the justiﬁcations in Tuples 4 and 5. 8
8 It is important to note that Ucut-attackers of q ⇒ q may still be derived in an extension of D. However,
as note above, by Condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 3.8(c) they cannot be used for eliminating q ⇒ q.
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Thus, the above derivation cannot be extended to a derivation in which q ⇒ q is
eliminated, and so S1 |∼ q.
The situation is completely diﬀerent as far as p⇒p is concerned. This is due to
the fact that the above derivation can be extended by the following tuples, yielding
an elimination of p⇒p:
7. ¬p ⇒ ¬p Axiom
8. p 
⇒ p Ucut, 7, 7, 7, 1 ¬p ⇒ ¬p
In turn, this derivation can be further extended, to get an attack on ¬p⇒¬p:
9. p ⇒ ¬¬p . . .
10. ¬¬p ⇒ p . . .
11. ¬p 
⇒ ¬p Ucut, 1, 9, 10, 7 p ⇒ p
In the last derivation p ⇒ p is not eliminated anymore. Nevertheless, p⇒p can
be re-attacked by the sequent ¬p⇒¬p. Alternatively, p⇒p can be re-attacked by
any sequent of the form ¬p ⇒ ψ, where ψ is equivalent to ¬p (e.g., ψ = ¬2n+1p, i.e.,
a formula in which p is preceded by an odd number of negations). As a consequence,
p 
⇒ p is reintroduced in extensions of this derivation, and similarly ¬p 
⇒ ¬p may
be reintroduced as well. It follows that neither of these sequents is ﬁnally derived.
In an analogous way any dynamic derivation based on S1 can always be extended
in such a way that all the sequents in ArgL(S1) whose conclusion is p (respectively,
¬p) are eliminated, and so S1 
|∼ p (respectively, S1 
|∼ ¬p).
This state of aﬀairs is intuitively justiﬁed by the fact that while q is not related
to the inconsistency in S1 and so it may safely follow from S1, the information in
S1 about p is contradictory, and so neither p nor ¬p may be safely inferred from S1.
Example 4.2 Let us consider the following variation of the previous example. The
underlying setting is the same as before: S= 〈CL, LK,Ucut〉, but now we take the
conjunction of p and q: S ′1 = {p ∧ q,¬p}. Again, although both of p ∧ q⇒ p and
¬p⇒¬p are LK-derivable, neither p nor ¬p follows according toS from S ′1, because,
e.g., the ﬁrst sequent Ucut-attacks the other sequent and is Ucut-attacked by the
sequent ¬p ⇒ ¬(p∧ q) (the details are quite similar to those in Example 4.1). This
time, however, q is not S-derivable from S ′1, because both the sequents p ∧ q ⇒ q
and ¬p, p∧q ⇒ q are also Ucut-attacked by the LK-derivable sequent ¬p ⇒ ¬(p∧q)
and cannot be permanently defended by sequents in ArgCL(S ′1). 9
Note 4 The last two examples show in particular that |∼S is sensitive to the syn-
tactic form of the premises: although S1 (Example 4.1) and S ′1 (Example 4.2) are
CL-equivalent, their S-conclusions are not the same. This may be intuitively jus-
tiﬁed by the fact that in S ′1, unlike in S1, q is not neutral with respect to the
inconsistency of the set of premises and it is ‘linked’ to p by the conjunction (as
is also reﬂected by the above Ucut-attack on p ∧ q). Indeed, syntax sensitivity is
9 Note that the ArgCL(S′1)-sequent p ∧ q ⇒ p does not prevent the Ucut-attack on p ∧ q ⇒ q by the
ArgCL(S′1)-sequent ¬p ⇒ ¬(p ∧ q), because the latter attacks both of them. This situation is diﬀerent from
the one in Example 4.1, where ⇒ p∨¬p ‘blocks’ any potential Ucut-attack on q ⇒ q, since in Example 4.1
⇒ p ∨ ¬p couldn’t be counter Ucut-attacked.
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not unusual in the context of non-monotonic reasoning. The same phenomenon
is implied by Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates for iterated belief revision [10], ac-
cording to which a new information abolishes any existing data that contradicts
it. Thus, for instance, if Reasoner 1 ‘believes’ that p ∧ q and Reasoner 2 ‘believes’
that p and that q, the introduction of ¬p forces Reasoner 1 to retract p ∧ q, while
Reasoner 2 has to withdraw p only. As a consequence, Reasoner 2 still believes q,
while Reasoner 1 has no indication that q holds. A similar phenomenon happens
when the maximally consistent subsets of the premises are taken into account: q is
in the intersection of the maximally consistent subsets of S1, while the intersection
of the maximally consistent subsets of S ′1 is empty (see also [19]). 10
Example 4.3 Consider a logic with a negation connective ¬ (so p 
	 ¬p and¬p 
	 p),
which doesn’t respect double-negation introduction (i.e., p 
	 ¬¬p), and sup-
pose that Direct Defeat (D-Def; See Figure 2) is the only attack rule. Let
S2 = {p,¬p,¬¬p,¬¬¬p,¬¬¬¬p}. We write si (i ∈ N) for the sequent ¬ip ⇒ ¬ip
(where ¬0p = p). Note that by reﬂexivity si is provable in any complete calculus
for the base logic. Now, consider the following sequence D of proof tuples:
1. s0 Axiom
2. s1 Axiom
3. s2 Axiom
4. s1 D-Def, 3, 3, 2 s2
5. s3 Axiom
6. s0 D-Def, 2, 2, 1 s1
7. s2 D-Def, 5, 5, 3 s3
8. s4 Axiom
It is easy to verify that D is a valid derivation. Extending it only with the tuple
9. s3 D-Def, 8, 8, 5 s4
yields a simple derivation D′, in which the attacker (s4) is not counter-attacked
by an accepted sequent, yet D′ is not coherent since s1 ∈ Attack(D′) ∩ Elim(D′). 11
Note, however, that D may be extended to a coherent derivation containing Tuple 9,
provided that the latter is introduced together with the following eliminating tuple:
10. s1 D-Def, 3, 3, 2 s2
Indeed, the extension of D with the sequence 〈T9, T10〉 is a valid derivation. This
demonstrates the need in Deﬁnition 3.8 to introduce more than one elimination
tuple at a time.
Let us now check what can be ﬁnally derived from S2. First, the sequent s4 is
attacked according to D-Def only by sequents whose right-hand side is ¬5p, but since
double-negation introduction does not hold, such sequents cannot be in ArgL(S2).
10Syntax dependency ceases to hold when S1 (or S′1) is consistent. This follows from Proposition 5.2 below.
11 This shows, in particular, that the two conditions in Deﬁnition 3.8(c) are not dependent.
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It follows that s4 is ﬁnally derived by the above derivation, and so S2 |∼¬4p. Also, s3
cannot be ﬁnally derived since any derivation in which it is derived can be extended
by a tuple of the form 〈i, s3, D-Def, s4〉, which causes the elimination of s3. Thus
S2 
|∼¬3p. In turn, since the attacker (s3) of s2 is eliminated and cannot be recovered,
s2 is ﬁnally derived, thus S2 |∼ ¬¬p. Similar considerations show that in this case
S2 
|∼ ¬p and that S2 |∼ p.
Note 5 The last example emphasizes the basic diﬀerence between the derivation
process introduced here and the one considered in [3]. While the process in [3]
allows to reintroduce sequents irrespective of whether they are attacked, here the
way sequents can be introduced in a proof is restricted and it depends on the already
introduced elimination sequents. Thus, e.g., while according to the approach in [3]
the sequent ¬p ⇒ ¬p may be reintroduced in an extension of the dynamic derivation
of Example 4.3, this is not possible according to the present formalism. Hence,
according to [3] only s4 is ﬁnally derivable in Example 4.3, while in our case both s2
and s0 are also ﬁnally derivable, although they are attacked. This allows for a better
‘diﬀusion of attacks’ and it is in line with standard extensions of the corresponding
argumentation frameworks (see [11]): although s2 is attacked by s3, that attack
is counter-attacked by s4, and so s2 is ‘defended’ or ‘reinstated’ by s4 (see also
Proposition 3.6).
5 Some Properties of |∼
In this section we consider some properties of the entailment relations that are
induced by dynamic proof systems according to Deﬁnition 3.12. We still denote by
|∼ an arbitrary entailment relation that is covered by this deﬁnition. Due to lack of
space proofs in this section are omitted and will appear in an extended version of
this paper.
Relations between |∼ and 	
We start with some results concerning the relations between the base consequence
relation and the entailments induced by the corresponding argumentation setting.
In these propositions we refer to an entailment |∼ that is induced by an argumen-
tation setting S = 〈L,C,A〉 with a base logic L = 〈L,	〉.
(i) Tarskian consequence relations may be viewed as particular S-entailments:
Proposition 5.1 If A = ∅ then |∼ and 	 coincide.
(ii) Another case where |∼ and 	 correlate is the following:
Proposition 5.2 If S is conﬂict-free with respect to S (that is, there are no A-
attacks between the elements in ArgL(S)), then S |∼ ψ iﬀ S 	 ψ.
(iii) In general, |∼ is weaker than 	:
Proposition 5.3 If S |∼ ψ then S 	 ψ.
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(iv) The converse of Proposition 5.3 holds for 	-theorems and theorem-preserving
rules:
Deﬁnition 5.4 An elimination rule R of the form of (2) above is theorem-preserving
(with respect to a logic L), if there is no application of R by a substitution θ such
that θ(Γn) = ∅.
Intuitively, a rule is theorem-preserving if it cannot be used for attacking theo-
rems of the underlying (base) logic. The various variations of Undercut and Defeat
in Figure 2 are examples of rules that are theorem-preserving with respect to any
logic.
Proposition 5.5 If A consists only of theorem-preserving rules, then 	 ψ implies
that |∼ ψ.
Corollary 5.6 If A consists only of theorem-preserving rules, then (i) 	 ψ iﬀ |∼ψ,
and (ii) C is weakly sound and complete for |∼ (that is, |∼ψ iﬀ ⇒ψ is C-derivable).
We note also that some properties of the base logic are ‘inherited’ by |∼. One of
them is ¬-paraconsistency [9]:
Proposition 5.7 If 	 is ¬-paraconsistent (that is, there are atoms p, q such that
p,¬p 
	 q) then so is |∼.
Cautious Reﬂexivity
As the examples in Section 4 show, in general |∼ is not reﬂexive: a formula ψ does
not necessarily follow from S even if ψ ∈ S. Yet, the next proposition and corollary
show that |∼ is cautiously reﬂexive.
Proposition 5.8 If S is conﬂict-free then S |∼ ψ for all ψ ∈ S.
Corollary 5.9
(i) For every formula ψ such that {ψ} is conﬂict-free in S, we have that ψ |∼ ψ.
(ii) For every atom p it holds that p |∼ p.
Note 6 The condition in the last proposition and corollary is indeed required. For
instance, if |∼ is the entailment relation that is induced by S = 〈CL, LK, {Ucut}〉
(Example 4.1) then p ∧ ¬p 
|∼ p ∧ ¬p.
Restricted Monotonicity
Clearly, |∼ is not monotonic. For instance, by Corollary 5.9 p |∼p while Example 4.1
shows a case in which p,¬p, q 
|∼ p. Like reﬂexivity, monotonicity can be guaranteed
in particular cases. For instance, as Proposition 5.12 below shows, when adding
unrelated information to a framework with Undercut, this information should not
disturb previous inferences. For this proposition we ﬁrst deﬁne in precise terms what
‘unrelated information’ means and then recall the known notion of uniformity.
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Deﬁnition 5.10 Let S be a set of formulas and ψ a formula in a language L. We
denote by Atoms(S) the set of atomic formulas that appear (in some subformula of
a formula) in S. We say that S is relevant to ψ, if Atoms(S) ∩ Atoms({ψ}) = ∅
implies that S = ∅. A nonempty set S is irrelevant to a (nonempty) set T if S is
not relevant to any formula in T , i.e.: Atoms(S) ∩ Atoms(T ) = ∅.
Deﬁnition 5.11 Let L = 〈L,	〉 be a propositional logic. A set S of L-formulas
is 	-consistent , if there exists an L-formula ψ such that S 
	 ψ. We say that L is
uniform, if S1 	 ψ when S1,S2 	 ψ and S2 is 	-consistent and irrelevant to S1∪{ψ}.
Note 7 By Los-Suzsko Theorem [15], a ﬁnitary propositional logic 〈L,	〉 is uniform
iﬀ it has a single characteristic matrix (see also [23]). Thus, classical logic as well
as many other logics are uniform.
Proposition 5.12 Let S = 〈L,C, {Ucut}〉 be a setting whose base logic L is uni-
form, and let |∼ be the induced entailment. If S1 |∼ ψ and S2 is a 	-consistent set
of formulas that is irrelevant to S1, then S1,S2 |∼ ψ.
Note 8 A crucial property for Proposition 5.12 is that Ucut-attacks are preserved
when the premises of the attacked sequents are weakened: if Γ ⇒ ψ is Ucut-attacked
then Γ′ ⇒ ψ is Ucut-attacked (by the same attacker) whenever Γ′ contains Γ.
Note 9 The last proposition holds also for Direct Undercut. Under the additional
condition that S2 is irrelevant to {ψ} the proposition holds also for Rebuttal.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have introduced a deductive method for reasoning with sequent-based argu-
mentation systems. The non-monotonic nature of its derivations resembles other
dynamic proof systems in other contexts, such as adaptive logics [7,21]. In our
setting, a proof progressing over derivation steps may be viewed as a dialogue
explicating actual (dynamic) reasoning in an argumentation framework. This,
and other opportunities of using dynamic derivations for imitating commonsense
reasoning, as well as the exact relations to related semantics, like those that are
induced by Dung-style formalisms, should yet be explored in future work.
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